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A REJOINDER TO ABRAHAM HIRSCH
BY
SAMUEL HOLLANDER AND SANDRA PEART
The dispute between Hollander and Peart, and Hirsch, turns on the nature and
role of veri cation in Mill’s perception of the appropriate method for Political
Economy. Professor Hirsch maintains against us that, for Mill, the models
constructed by political economists are insulated from veri cation. His case is
based on two counterclaims. First, that when Mill writes of “veri cation” in
Book III of the Logic, he has in mind a procedure differing from that appropriate
for Political Economy, which allows only “indirect veri cation” (outlined in
Book VI). Hirsch  nds that Hollander and Peart confuse the two. Secondly, since
the contexts of our case studies often relate to policy formulation, Hirsch  nds
our elucidations of an appeal to experience of a more basic order to be
unconvincing.
Not surprisingly in the light of Mill’s varied and active interests in policy
formation, when Mill engages in speci c “veri cation” exercises, he often does
so in the context of policy applications. This does not imply, however, that
veri cation only occurs in the context of policy analysis. Our purpose has been
to demonstrate: (i) that veri cation plays a more signi cant role in Mill’s
methodological recommendations than has been allowed; and (ii) that he himself
engaged in substantive and hitherto unrecognized theory revision as a result of
such a process. We also remain convinced that Mill takes seriously the challenge
of verifying what Professor Hirsch refers to as the more “basic science” and
what we chose to call the axiomatic framework of the science.
Let us  rst establish the essential fact that both in Book III and in Book VI,
Mill insists on the applicability of the deductive method to all scienti c
endeavors entailing multiple cause relationships. Chapter 11 of Book III, entitled
“The Deductive Method,” makes it clear that the method pertains to physical and
social, inexact and exact, sciences:
Thus, if the subject be social or historical phenomena, the premises of the
Deductive Method must be the laws of the causes which determine that class
of phenomena; and those causes are human actions, together with the general
outward circumstances under the in uence of which mankind are placed, and
which constitute man’s position on the earth. The Deductive Method, applied
to social phenomena, must begin, therefore, by investigating, or must suppose
to have been already investigated, the laws of human action, and those
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properties of outward things by which the actions of human beings in society
are determined (1843/1973–74, p. 454).
When Mill turns in Book VI to the Moral Sciences, he reiterates that the
methods appropriate in these scienti c endeavors had already been elucidated in
Book III:
In substance, whatever can be done in a work like this for the Logic of the
Moral Sciences, has been or ought to have been accomplished in the  ve
preceding Books; to which the present can be only a kind of supplement or
appendix, since the methods of investigation applicable to moral and social
science must have been already described, if I have succeeded in enumerating
and characterizing those of science in general (p. 835).
Mill does indeed insist, as Professor Hirsch recognizes, that the process of
“Veri cation” requires modi cation in Moral and Social Sciences. But what
does this imply? Mill bases his case for a specialist science of Political Economy
on the pragmatic grounds that economic transactions are, for the most part,
motivated by the self-interest axiom (p. 901), which circumstance permits some
reduction of the complexity of the causal framework. But con dence that the
scientist may proceed as a “ rst approximation” on this basis does not constitute
a claim that veri cation of economic theory is unnecessary or impossible. On the
contrary, Mill remarks that “Veri cation by Speci c Experience” is an
“indispensable element in all deductive sciences” (p. 907). The dif culties of
veri cation to which he now proceeds re ect the problem that rarely, if ever, do
we observe repetitions of the exact set of causal relations in operation all at once,
thus precluding the derivation of “empirical laws.” But there does remain
Indirect Veri cation of economic theory, represented by Mill as an essential
ingredient of the method of Political Economy. It is wrong to suppose that he
accords economic theory a heightened sense of certainty or allows only an
insubstantial role (or none at all) for its veri cation. We shall return to this
fundamental issue after considering some of the speci cs of Hirsch’s case.
Professor Hirsch writes that he:
Find[s] little evidence for the argument that “Mill allowed for the alteration of
the basic model in consequence of the procedure of veri cation—testing
against speci c experience: its ‘improvement,’ ‘correction,’ ‘completion,’
‘extension’ ” (Hollander 1985, p. 120), giving the impression that Mill took
this to be an everyday occurrence that goes on routinely and continuously over
time. As I see it, what Mill says about testing hypotheses designed to deal with
policy questions Hollander and Peart take to apply to the testing of the basic
model of economic science (Hirsch 2000, pp. 355–56).
Now whether “veri cation” goes on “routinely and continuously over time” is
not, of course, the fundamental issue. The fundamental issue is whether Mill
allowed at all for model improvement resulting from a veri cation exercise,
since it is the major premise of the secondary literature that he did not. By
introducing the business of “everyday occurrence” Hirsch leaves himself an
escape hatch—testing might conceivably generate model improvement but it
would be highly unusual. Throughout his section 4—as in his 1992 article—we
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encounter references to the dif culty, but not impossibility, of model improve-
ment via veri cation:
It is conceivable, as Mill suggests in the Essay, that the economist comes to
the conclusion that the disturbing causes, particularly if they relate to the
economic motive, are important enough to be incorporated into the general
model of the science. But to do this intelligently the economist would have to
wait for a great deal of additional evidence since unless this deviation is found
in many other instances it would be inappropriate to make even a relatively
small change (p. 355).
Of course, it is conceivable that the conclusion that the basic model of
economic science falls short could result from a veri cation process after a lot
of tests of policy hypotheses had been performed over a long period of time
and covering a very large number of different types of application, though the
likelihood of this happening seems very small (p. 355).
Hirsch, after all, thus goes a long away in our direction on a matter of principle.
Unfortunately, having made the concession he forgets about it entirely: “Mill
may have moved more or less from the a priori in different places, but for
economics he moved only to the extent of allowing for disturbing causes”
(p. 358; also p. 357). Model improvement, for Mill, is not conceivable!
As to whether or not Mill envisaged the testing process as an “everyday
occurrence,” we  nd it convenient to let him speak—very brie y—for himself
regarding the heavy and continuous responsibility of the “speculative thinker” in
this regard:
His knowledge must at least enable him to explain and account for what is, or
he is an insuf cient judge of what ought to be. If a political economist, for
instance,  nds himself puzzled by any recent or present commercial phenom-
ena; if there is any mystery to him in the late or present state of the productive
industry of the country, which his knowledge of principle does not enable him
to unriddle; he may be sure that something is wanting to render his system of
opinions a safe guide in existing circumstances. Either some of the facts which
in uence the situation of the country and the course of events are not known
to him; or, knowing them, he knows not what ought to be their effects. In the
latter case his system is imperfect even as an abstract system; it does not
enable him to trace correctly all the consequences even of assumed premises
(1836/1967, p. 335).
The task of seeking to account for “residuums” is a permanent obligation to be
undertaken “upon every new combination of facts as it arises,” and one that
might “furnish the occasion for a consequent enlargement or correction of his
general views” (pp. 335–36).1
The closing sentence of the above indented extract makes it crystal clear that
Mill is discussing efforts to “perfect” an “abstract system.” And it is the
theorist’s “general views” that would—as a result of a successful quest to
explain a “residuum”—be “enlarged” or “corrected.” As Mill puts it in the full
extract, the process should not be undertaken “with the desire of  nding his
1 It should be unnecessary to repeat our position that the veri cation exercise itself might in practice
be undertaken by someone other than the theorist, or by the theorist in another capacity.
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[abstract] system complete, but of making it so.” These are several of the
terms—“enlarged,” “corrected,” “completed”—Hirsch prefers to pass over
(above 351). It is wholly unconvincing to claim, as Hirsch claims, that the
context applies only to “the testing of hypotheses designed to deal with policy
questions” ; it is certainly not “evident that Mill is … talking about the appli-
cation even where [he] talks about ‘theory’ and ‘abstract systems’ ” (p. 359, also
353–54, albeit that the object of model improvement is largely—though, we
shall see, not entirely—to permit sensible policy applications.
The remaining terms on our list—“improvement” and “extension”—are found
in the System of Logic in that section on “The Veri cation of the Social Science”
alluded to above, with illustrations drawn speci cally from economics: the
effect … of corn laws, or of a prohibitive commercial system generally” (1843/
1973–74, p. 908). The message conveyed is precisely that of the Essay, namely
the need for ongoing veri cation, in economics, to assure a suf ciently perfect
theory to enable us to assign their consequences even where “the facts which
ought to be taken into account” are “completely known to us”—“a suf ciently
perfect theory to enable us to assign their consequences” (p. 910). And the
moral regarding the treatment of unexplained residuals is also precisely as in the
Essay:
To prove (in short) that our science, and our knowledge of the particular case,
render us competent to predict the future, we must show that they would have
enabled us to predict the present and the past. If there be anything which we
could not have predicted, this constitutes a residual phenomenon, requiring
further study for the purpose of explanation; and we must either search among
the circumstances of the particular case until we  nd one which, on the
principles of our existing theory, accounts for the unexplained phenomenon, or
we must turn back, and seek the explanation by an extension and improvement
of the theory itself (emphasis added).
Where in all this is there appeal to “policy?” Mill even af rmed that where
theory falls short, we are not “in the present state of our knowledge, fully
competent to draw conclusions, speculative or practical” (emphasis added).
There may be no immediate policy implications at stake at all.
Considering Mill’s position regarding theory improvement, his statement with
respect to economics that “veri cation is no part of the business of science at all,
but of the application of science,”2 can only be read in our fashion, namely that
veri cation plays on theory indirectly by revealing to the theorist the need to
engage in model improvement (1999, p. 381). There is nothing particularly
“sophisticated” about this, nor do we “explain [the statement] away” as Hirsch
charges (p. 350). It is, we have seen, Mill who uses the term “indirect
veri cation” in the System of Logic—and with reference to economics—to
describe the process to which we have referred:
Although, however, direct veri cation is impossible, there is an indirect
2 And similarly the statement that “the method a posteriori, or that of speci c experience,” is of “great
value in the moral sciences… not as a means of discovering truth but of verifying it …” (1836/1967,
p. 331).
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veri cation, which is scarcely of less value, and which is always practicable.
The conclusion drawn as to the individual case, can only be directly veri ed
in that case; but it is veri ed indirectly, by the veri cation of other conclu-
sions, drawn in other individual cases from the same laws. The experience
which comes too late to verify the particular proposition to which it refers, is
not too late to help towards verifying the general suf ciency of the theory. The
test of the degree in which the science affords safe ground for predicting (and
consequently for practically dealing with) what has not yet happened, is the
degree in which it would have enabled us to predict what has actually
occurred. Before our theory of the in uence of a particular cause, in a given
state of circumstances, can be entirely trusted, we must be able to explain and
account for the existing state of all that portion of the social phenomena which
that cause has a tendency to in uence (1843/1973–74, pp. 909–10).
When Hirsch (p. 352 also p. 358) to reinforce his case, cites Mill (p. 908) to the
effect that “in those more special inquiries which form the subject of the separate
branches of the social science, [the] two-fold logical process and reciprocal
veri cation is not possible,” he misses the point. For, as already pointed out,
Mill is here ruling out only that sort of veri cation which turns on the existence
of “empirical laws”; but where (as the citation continues) “speci c experience
affords nothing amounting to empirical laws”—as in economics (vide the
illustration regarding Corn Laws and Prohibitive Restrictions)—recourse to
“indirect veri cation” is called for. Much of the problem with Hirsch’s section
6 entails the apparent identi cation of Mill’s discussion of “reciprocal
veri cation” with that of “indirect veri cation” applicable in economics. And it
is perhaps this con ation of the two categories of veri cation that leads him to
exaggerate the differences between us (see in particular, his closing section).
